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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Florida only decided three cases directly related
to children's issues in the past years: two in the delinquency area and one
governing termination of parental rights. The intermediate appellate courts
again remained active-particularly in the termination of parental rights
field. On the other hand, in the juvenile delinquency area, most of the deci-
sions dealt with generic issues of criminal procedure that are not unique to
the juvenile delinquency field, and thus are not covered in this article. Sev-
eral changes in Chapters 39 and 985 require brief review.
II. DEPENDENCY
Incarceration can constitute grounds for a finding of dependency in the
form of abandonment.' In the termination of parental rights context, the test
for termination based upon incarceration is different and requires that the
period of incarceration be a substantial portion of the time before the child
reaches the age of eighteen.2 However, the incarceration alone cannot rise to
the level of abandonment unless there is also a showing that the parent has
not provided for support and has not established or maintained a substantial
relationship with the child.' "Marginal efforts and incidental or token visits
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. This
Survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010. This
article marks Professor Dale's twentieth Nova Law Review juvenile law survey.
1. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1) (2010).
2. Id. § 39.806(1)(d)(1).
3. See id.; id. § 39.01(1).
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or communications" are insufficient under the statute.4 In B.T. v. Depart-
ment of Children & Families,5 a father appealed a final order of dependency
on grounds of abandonment due to his incarceration.6 The father had "nu-
merous convictions for drug and firearm offenses and ha[d] been incarce-
rated since" the child's birth.7 At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, he
was serving ninety-six months in prison.8 Recognizing that incarceration is a
factor in abandonment but may not be the sole standard, the appellate court
found that the father had testified that he failed to make financial payments
because of incarceration and received photographs of his child.9 Although
the Department of Children and Families (DCF) offered no other evidence,
the appellate court affirmed, yet remanded for the court to make findings in
accordance with the opinion that the father failed to make adequate efforts to
see and support his child. I°
When the child is taken from the home, the initial proceeding, known as
a shelter hearing in Florida, involves notification to the parents, appointment
of a guardian ad litem, informing the parents of their right to counsel, and
establishment of "probable cause that reasonable grounds for removal exist,"
shown by DCF. In L.M.B. v. Department of Children & Families," a mother
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in an effort to "quash the trial court's
shelter order which sheltered her three-year-old child in the father's home."' 2
The trial court conducted a shelter hearing prior to entering the order, but
refused to allow the mother to present evidence regarding whether the child
should be removed.'3 The trial court held that by reviewing the probable
cause for removal question it could make its determination from the "'four
corners' of the verified shelter petition."' 4 When the mother subsequently
consented to the adjudication of dependency, the appellate court nonetheless
ruled on the issue, as it was "important and capable of repetition, yet evading
review. '"5 Relying on decisions from other Florida District Courts of Ap-
peal, the court held that a parent has a statutory right to be heard and present
4. Id. § 39.01(1).
5. 16 So. 3d 940 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
6. Id. at 941.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 941-42.
10. B.T., 16 So. 3d at 941-42.
11. 28 So. 3d 217 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 218.
13. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.402(2) (2009)).
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing L.M.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 935 So. 2d 47, 47 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006)).
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evidence at a shelter hearing. 6 In so ruling, the court held that affidavits
from the parties may be an adequate substitute for live testimony. 7
An interesting issue involving the application of section 57.105 deals
with an award of attorney's fees in a case where party and counsel knew or
should have known that the claim was not supported by facts or an applica-
tion of then-existing law arose this survey year in the dependency context.
In Department of Children & Families v. S.E.,"8 DCF appealed from a trial
court's fee award in favor of the mother pursuant to section 57.105.'9 The
trial court granted the mother's motion to dismiss the dependency proceeding
based upon a letter from the statewide medical director of the child protec-
tion teams of the Department although two physicians had concluded that the
child was the victim of Munchausen Syndrome by proxy. ° DCF decided to
proceed, however, on the ground that the mother still posed a threat of harm
despite the director's letter.2' The parent filed a renewed motion to dismiss
on the grounds that the "amended petition failed to specifically set forth the
acts or omissions upon which the petition was based."22  The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss and subsequently held a hearing on the moth-
er's entitlement to fees.23 Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the ap-
pellate court reversed the finding of an entitlement to fees, holding that at the
time of the filing, DCF quite properly relied upon the opinions of medical
professionals and thus was "always supported by the necessary material facts
to overcome an award" under section 57.105.4
II. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Florida law provides that it is possible for a parent to impliedly consent
to termination of parental rights based upon the parent's failure to personally
appear at the adjudicatory hearing.25 The appellate courts regularly deal with
cases involving termination of parental rights based upon a parent's failure to
appear.26 The specific question before the Supreme Court in Florida De-
16. L.M.B., 28 So. 3d at 219. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.402(8)(a) (2009)).
17. Id. at 218 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.305(b)(5)).
18. 12 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 902.
20. Id. at 902-03.
21. Id. at903.
22. Id.
23. S.E., 12 So. 3d at 903.
24. Id. at 903-04.
25. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2010).
26. See Michael J. Dale, 2007-2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 NOVA L. REv. 357, 371-
72 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2007-2008 Survey].
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partment of Children & Family Services v. P.E. ,27 was "whether, when con-
sent to termination of parental rights has been entered... upon the parent's
failure personally to appear at the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court must
nevertheless receive evidence of the grounds for termination alleged in the
petition for termination of parental rights. 28 The case was before the Su-
preme Court because of a conflict in opinions by the intermediate appellate
courts." The Supreme Court held that when an order terminating parental
rights on the basis of implied consent occurs, the parent's failure to appear
constitutes a form of consent to the adjudication, and "the parent may not
challenge the basis for the termination of parental rights."3 The parents'
failure to appear constitutes a form of default. 3' The Supreme Court did rec-
ognize that a parent may vacate the judgment by meeting a three part test
showing: due diligence, excusable neglect, and the existence of a merito-
rious defense to the proceeding.32 Finally, the Supreme Court found in the
case before it that the trial court concluded that the mother's testimony was
not credible and that she did not offer any evidence of the third prong; thus,
it affirmed the ruling of the Second District Court of Appeal.33
A second case involving termination of parental rights (TPR) based
upon a parent's failure to appear is A.H. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies.34 In that case, a month before the TPR trial, the father emailed his attor-
ney to say that he could not appear because he lacked the financial resources
to fly in for the hearing from New York where he lived.35 The court had
previously advised the father that he had to appear at trial.36 At a status con-
ference, where the father appeared telephonically, he explained that he could
27. 14 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 2009).
28. Id. at 234.
29. See id.; P.E. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re H.E.), 3 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), approved by 14 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 2009); S.S. v. State Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 976 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), overruled in part by Fla. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 2009); R.H. v. Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 860 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), overruled in part by Fla. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 2009); Dep't of Children & Families v.
A.S., 927 So. 2d 204 (Fla- 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
30. P.E., 14 So. 3d at 236; see also R.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 997 So. 2d
1216, 1218 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Michael J. Dale, 2009 Survey of Juvenile Law, 34
NOVA L. REv. 199, 212-13 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2009 Survey].
31. P.E., 14So.3dat230.
32. Id. at 236 (citing E.S. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 878 So. 2d 493, 496
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.540(b)(1)).
33. Id. at 237.
34. 22 So. 3d 801 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
35. Id. at 802.
36. Id.
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not attend the trial, and the court stated, "Okay. Well, your attorney will be
here."37 When the father failed to appear three days later for the TPR hear-
ing, DCF asked the court to enter a consent to termination judgment. 38 The
father's lawyer objected for the record without further elaboration. 39 The
appellate court reversed, finding that the court's statement to the appellant
intimated that the appellant's attorney could appear for the father. n0 The
court further noted that the appellant's "attorney failed to request a conti-
nuance, made a half-hearted objection to the request for default and sought to
be discharged at the first available opportunity."' Although the appellate
court did not comment in other respects upon the attorney's conduct,42 the
court reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion.43
An important evidentiary issue that arises regularly in Florida as well as
in other jurisdictions is the question of hearsay statements by children in
child protection cases.44 In T.O. v. Department of Children & Families,45 a
mother and father appealed from termination of their parental rights to four
children.46 Although it affirmed, the appellate court, nonetheless, discussed
the hearsay statements of the two children in which a number of witnesses
testified that the children described violence between their parents and be-
tween the father and an older brother.47 The children were allowed to testify
in camera, although one of the children answered several questions but de-
clined to answer questions about her parents.48 The Florida Rules of Evi-
dence contain an exception to hearsay for the admission of child victim
statements. 49 However, prior to the admission of such statements, the trial
court is obligated to conduct a hearing and make a preliminary determination
that the hearsay statements come from a trustworthy source and are reliable.5"
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. A.H., 22 So. 3d at 802.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Dale, 2009 Survey, supra note 30, at 210; Michele R. Forte, Comment, Making
the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights Pro-
ceedings, 28 NOVA L. REV. 193, 194-95 (2003) (discussing the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel in child welfare cases in Florida).
43. A.H., 22 So. 3d at 803.
44. See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, § 7.07 (2010) [hereinafter
DALE, CHILD CLIENT].
45. 21 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
46. Id. at 174.
47. Id. at 175.
48. Id.
49. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (2010).
50. Id.
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Furthermore, the child must then either testify at trial or be declared unavail-
able.5 ' If the child is unavailable, the hearsay statements may still be admiss-
ible, but only after the court determines that there is corroborating evidence
verifying the abuse or neglect.52 The appellate court held that the child was
unavailable under the Florida Rules of Evidence because she persisted in
refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of her statement.53 Thus, the
appellate court concluded, the child was unavailable to testify, and the
child's hearsay statements were admissible because "there was sufficient
corroborating evidence of the sexual abuse."'
Complicated procedural issues can arise when an appellate court re-
verses the termination of parental rights as to one parent but affirms as to the
other. Such was the problem in Interest of l.R. v. Department of Children &
Family Services & Guardian Ad Litem Program.5 The difficulty in this sit-
uation is that only certain grounds apply under Florida law whereby termina-
tion of parental rights may occur as to one parent and not as to the other.56 In
the context of a case where termination of parental rights is sought against
both parents, the surviving ground allowing termination of the rights of one
parent must be one of those grounds permissible in a one parent termina-
tion.57 Only then is affirmance proper. However, where there is a reversal of
the order terminating one parent's parental rights and the remaining ground
does not allow for single parent termination, the entire case must be re-
manded for further proceedings.58
A second appellate opinion involving the issue of single parent termina-
tion of parental rights under Florida law is J.S. v. Department of Children &
Families.59 In that case, the trial court terminated the rights of the mother
and declined to terminate the rights of the father.60 The mother appealed the
order terminating her parental rights, and the Guardian Ad Litem Program
and DCF appealed the order declining to terminate the father's parental
rights.6' The appellate court reversed as to both trial court judgments.62 The
mother argued on appeal that the trial court was in error in finding grounds
51. Id. § 90.803(23)(a)(2).
52. Id.
53. T.O., 21 So. 3d at 178 (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.804(1)(b)).
54. Id.
55. 18 So. 3d 26, 27 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
56. See FLA. STAT. § 39.811(6)(e).
57. Id.
58. In re R.R.., 18 So. 3d at 27.
59. 18 So. 3d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1179.
[Vol. 35
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/5
SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW
for a single parent termination under the Florida Statute.63 The appellate
court agreed with the mother that the trial court did err in finding grounds for
a single parent termination because the trial court must consider additional
factors pursuant to Florida law when terminating one parent's parental rights
without terminating the parental rights of the other. 6 Reviewing the facts of
the case, findings set out in the trial court's order, and the ultimate disposi-
tion of the case, the appellate court concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion because the appellate court could not find evidence supporting the
specific additional factors necessary for a single parent termination.65
Questions occasionally come up concerning treating sibling differently
in dependency and termination of parental rights cases. In W.P.R. v. De-
partment of Children & Family Services & Guardian Ad Litem Program,66 a
father appealed the termination of parental rights to his son, although the
father did reunify with three older children who also had been the subject of
the original dependency petition.67 The appellate court explained that the
father had received additional case plans for all four children and that his
actions with regard to each were identical. 68  According to the appellate
court, there had been no factual showing of different action toward the child-
ren or differences in the case plan but rather simply "disparate treatment of
the children. '69 DCF conceded error, and the appellate court reversed and
remanded.70 However, in dicta, the appellate court recognized that it is poss-
ible to treat siblings differently in TPR proceedings but not where the sole
reason for treating the children differently is the adoptability of an individual
child.7'
Under Florida law, termination of parental rights requires DCF to prove
three elements: 1) grounds for termination, 2) termination as "the least re-
strictive means of protecting the child from serious harm," and 3) "termina-
tion is in the child's best interest. '72 In R.A. v. Department of Children &
63. Id. at 1174.
64. J.S., 18 So. 3d at 1174; see FLA. STAT. § 39.811(6) (2010)).
65. Id. at 1175-76.
66. 17 So. 3d 851 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
67. Id. at 852.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 853 (citing B.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 793 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2001)).
71. In re R.R., 17 So. 3d at 853.
72. Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 568-69 (Fla.
1991); E.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re E.D.), 884 So. 2d 291, 295 n.3 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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Families,73 the Fifth District reversed the trial court order terminating a fa-
ther's parental rights after conducting an ordered analysis of the tri-part
test.74 As to the least restrictive means of protecting the child, the appellate
court found that the evidence of prospective harm was speculative, at best.
75
It then further held that the trial court's conclusion that proof of statutory
grounds was enough to terminate parental rights simply ignored the statutory
requirement that termination be in the manifest best interest of the child.76
While most child protection cases involve petitions filed by DCF, it is
possible for private parties, including parents, to file both petitions for de-
pendency and for termination of parental rights. In H.D. v. J.L.D. 77 a mother
of an eleven-year-old child appealed the denial of a petition for termination
of the parental rights of the child's adoptive father.78 Apparently, the trial
court did so without holding a hearing. In her petition, the mother had stated
that the "adoptive father voluntarily executed an affidavit of surrender of...
parental rights" and that it was in the child's best interest to terminate them.79
Without holding a hearing, the trial court found that "terminating [the adop-
tive father's] parental rights would not serve 'the manifest best interests' of
the minor child," in that it would terminate the child's right to support.8' The
appellate court recognized that, on the one hand, Chapter 39 does allow cer-
tain shortcuts to termination when there is a "'voluntary surrender of parental
rights."'' 8' However, an adjudicatory hearing is nonetheless required in vo-
luntary termination cases, and the trial court does have the power to deny a
petition for termination where to do so may terminate the responsibility of
the respondent parent to provide substantial support.82 However, the appel-
late court concluded, to deny the mother the right to a hearing constitutes a
denial of due process rights to present evidence that termination is in the
child's best interest.
83
73. 30 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
74. Id. at 724.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 16 So. 3d 334 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
78. Id. at 334.
79. Id. at 335.
80. Id. The appellate court quoted the trial's court's opinion.
81. Id. (quoting L.O. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 807 So. 2d 810, 812
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
82. H.D., 16 So. 3d at 335 (citing Rathbum v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 826
So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
83. Id.
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Case plans are an essential part of dependency proceedings in Florida as
elsewhere. 84 E.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services & Guardian
Ad Litem (In re E. C.)85 involved the question of the impact of the failure to
file a case plan which was "approved by the court and relied upon by the
parties throughout the proceedings., 86 The crucial fact in the case was that a
case plan addendum was never entered in the court file nor included as part
of the trial court record until the appendency of the appeal.87 The majority
held that the technical failure to file and the unique facts of the case were
such that the error did not go to "the foundation or the merits" of the matter
and thus was not fundamental error.88 However, there was a lengthy dissent
by Judge Wallace. 89 Although the dissent also would have reversed on other
grounds as to the failure to file an addendum to the case plan, the dissent
concluded that the request for "'termination . . . was fatally flawed from its
inception. '"'90 In other words, the termination was unauthorized by state
law.91
The second case involving appellate review of the trial court's ruling on
termination of parental rights for noncompliance with a case plan is S.F. v.
Department of Children & Family Services.92 In that case, the parents ap-
pealed from an order terminating parental rights to three children, and among
the issues was whether the parents failed to comply with the requirement of
their case plan under Florida law.93 The appellate court found that the trial
court did not distinguish its findings amongst the three children, two of
whom were parties to the original case plan, and a third child who had been
adjudicated dependent only seven months before the termination. 94 The
problem was that in Florida parents were entitled to a twelve month period to
comply with a case plan.95 In the case at bar, the youngest child was only
84. See I Michael J. Dale, Representing the Child Client, $ 407(2) (Matthew Bender 3d
ed. 2010).
85. 33 So. 3d 710 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
86. Id. at 711.
87. Id. at712 n.1.
88. Id. at 715.
89. See id. at 715-24(Wallace, J., dissenting).
90. In re E.C., 33 So. 3d at 722 (quoting Y.F. v. Dep't Children & Family Servs., 893 So.
2d 641, 642 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam)).
91. Id. at721.
92. 22 So. 3d 650 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
93. Id. at 654; see FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(2) (2010).
94. In re S.F., 22 So. 3d at 654.
95. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1).
2010]
9
Dale: 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAWREVIEW
nine months old at the time of the termination, and thus, the twelfth month
had not passed since that child was removed from the father's custody.96
The Florida appellate courts recently decided the question of the obliga-
tion of the Justice Administrative Commission to pay attorney's fees to law-
yers appointed to represent indigent parents in two terminations of parental
rights cases. In Justice Administration Commission v. Goette 7 and Justice
Administrative Commission v. Harp,98 the question was whether a lawyer
who was appointed to represent a parent who had voluntarily executed a
written surrender of parental rights was entitled to attorney's fees in the ter-
mination proceeding to be paid by the state commission. 99 In both cases, the
court held that the attorney would not receive fees from the state agency be-
cause once the parent had executed a written surrender, the parent no longer
had a right to appointed counsel in the termination proceeding.'0° Put in oth-
er words, the lawyer was "improperly appointed for the termination proceed-
ing."' 0 ' In Harp, the court explained that nothing in the Chapter 39 provision
governing termination of parental rights authorizes the court to appoint a
lawyer to a parent who executed a voluntary surrender.'12 The language of
the statute was plain and unambiguous.'0 3
IV. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
Rules concerning a speedy trial apply in juvenile delinquency cases. A
technical question concerning speedy trial requirements was before the Su-
preme Court of Florida in State v. Nelson.'" In that case, a juvenile was ar-
rested for armed burglary and carrying a concealed weapon.' 5 "Both the
ninety-day juvenile and 175-day adult speedy trial periods began to run from
the date of arrest," and before the expiration of either, the State filed a peti-
tion for delinquency. 1"6 However, the case was not scheduled for an adjudi-
catory hearing prior to the expiration of the juvenile speedy trial period.'0 7
At a hearing within days after the expiration of that period, the defense re-
96. In re S.F., 22 So. 3d at 654.
97. 32 So. 3d 786 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
98. 24 So. 3d 779 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
99. Goettel, 32 So. 3d at 786; Harp, 24 So. 3d at 780.
100. Goettel, 32 So. 3d at 787; Harp, 24 So. 3d at 781.
101. Goettel, 32 So. 3d at 786.
102. Harp, 24 So. 3d at 781.
103. Id.
104. 26 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 2010).
105. Id. at 572.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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quested a continuance to participate in discovery."°8 "[A] few days after the
adult speedy trial period expired, the State direct-filed an information in fe-
lony court."' 9 The question before the Supreme Court was the effect of a
post-expiration defense continuance on the procedural provisions of the
speedy trial rule."' The Court noted that, while under both the state and fed-
eral Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to a speedy and public
trial, a defendant, including a juvenile, may waive the right to a speedy hear-
ing."' After a detailed review of the complexities of the issue, the Court
held that the State is entitled to a "recapture period" under Florida law."' A
continuance chargeable to the defense which is made after expiration of the
speedy trial period but prior to a defendant filing a notice of expiration,
waives the defendant's speedy trial right under the default period of Florida
law."
3
Among the various dispositional alternatives available in a delinquency
case in Florida is revocation of a juvenile's driver license. Interpretation of
this type of disposition alternative was before the Second District Court of
Appeal in State v. KR.G.1 14 In that case, the juvenile committed the act of
possession of marijuana."' The juvenile court withheld adjudication and
placed the child on probation and declined to comply with certain mandatory
provisions which required it to revoke the child's driver's license for the
delinquent act of marijuana possession." 6 However, because the provision is
mandatory, the appellate court reversed."17
Although a juvenile is entitled to counsel free of charge if indigent, un-
der Florida law, the legislature has provided for assessment of attorney's fees
against the child who has been found to have committed an act of delinquen-
cy."' The question before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in W.Z. v.
State' was whether it was appropriate to enter an order requiring the child
and his parents to pay attorney's fees of fifty dollars for the work of the pub-
lic defender and for his parents to further pay the cost of two mental compe-
tency exams which had been ordered as a result of motions filed by the pub-
108. Id.
109. Nelson, 26 So. 3d at 572.
110. Id. at571-72.
111. Id. at 576.
112. Id. at 580.
113. Id.
114. 12 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
115. Id. at 1269.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1269-70.
118. See FLA. STAT. § 985.033(1) (2010).
119. 35 So. 3d 51 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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lic defender. 2 ' After affirming the award of attorney's fee, the appellate
court reversed as to the cost of the mental competence evaluations because
there is no provision in state law authorizing such assessment.'2 ' The court
could not find anything in statute or case law to support the proposition that
the child or the child's parents were obligated to pay these costs. 12 2 The
court thus reversed as to the latter charge.
23
The waiver of counsel in delinquency cases comes up regularly in Flor-
ida. Of course, the right to counsel is predicated upon the 1967 Supreme
Court of the United States opinion in In re Gault.'24 The right to counsel is
so important that Florida has established detailed rules of juvenile procedure
governing the waiver process. In N.S. v. State, 25 the trial court advised the
child at the disposition hearing that the child had a right to have counsel ap-
pointed during which the State presented evidence regarding restitution.
26
However, the trial court did not obtain the required written waiver. 27 Fur-
thermore, the record in the case did not show that an attorney discussed the
pros and cons of the waiver with the child. 28 The Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure provide that waiver of counsel may only happen "after the child
has had a meaningful opportunity to confer with counsel" regarding the con-
sequences of waiver and other relevant factors. 129 Furthermore, also pursuant
to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the child's "mother did not verify
in writing that she had discussed waiving counsel" with the child or that
waiver appeared to the mother to be knowing and voluntary. 130 While the
court would normally remand for resentencing, because the child was placed
on probation and an order was ultimately entered terminating supervision,
reversal was not necessary. 3'
In another technical case involving waiver of counsel, in AM.E. v.
State, 32 the child appeared at a hearing with her mother but with no coun-
sel.'33 At that time the child "waived her right to counsel, signed a written
120. Id. at51.
121. Id. at51-52.
122. Id. at 52.
123. Id. at 53.
124. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
125. 27 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
126. Id. at 794.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See FLA. R. Juv. P. § 8.165(a).
130. N.S., 27 So. 3d at 794.
131. Id.
132. 18 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
133. Id. at 1251.
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waiver of counsel, and entered a guilty plea., 134 In addition, the mother
signed the written waiver. 135 When the child later appeared for a disposition-
al hearing, the trial court did not renew the offer of counsel before adjudicat-
ing the child delinquent and ordering placement. 36 The appellate court held
that neither the trial court's inquiry of the child nor the waiver form fully
complied with the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.37 The State proper-
ly conceded error.138 However, because the child turned nineteen, the State
also raised the issue of whether the child was any longer "under the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile division of the trial court for purposes of remand."' 39 The
appellate court held that it could remand although it did not decide whether
other issues that might be raised once the case was remanded would be with-
in the jurisdiction of the trial court. 4°
Waiver of counsel is also relevant in delinquency cases involving revo-
cation of probation. In L.D.S.J. v. State,14' a child challenged the revocation
of probation in which he entered a plea without the assistance of counsel.'42
The argument on appeal was that the trial court did not determine whether
the child intelligently and knowingly waived the right to counsel nor whether
the court also failed to conduct a thorough inquiry into the child's voluntari-
ness of the waiver. 43 The appellate court agreed with the appellant.'" Re-
grettably, as the appellate court explained, "The record is devoid of any dis-
cussion regarding whether Appellant had an opportunity and whether that
opportunity was meaningful, to confer with an attorney regarding his right to
counsel."1 45 The appellate court also explained that the "trial court failed to
inquire about the child's comprehension of the offer" or his capacity to make
the choice or even the existence of any unusual circumstances that would
preclude the child "from exercising the right of self-representation." '146 The
court rejected the argument that the child and his mother signed a written
waiver of rights form as being adequate.' 47 However, even in that situation,
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. A.M.E., 18 So. 3d at 1251.
138. Id. at 1252.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 14 So. 3d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
142. Id. at 290.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 290-91.
146. L.D.S.J., 14 So. 3d at 291.
147. Id.
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there was no showing that anyone discussed with the child "the decision to
waive his right to counsel" or that the child "made a knowing and voluntary
decision to waive" it.' While it did not comment on the variety of ways
that the trial court failed to comply with the proper procedures for waiver,
the appellate court reversed and remanded.'49
The Supreme Court of Florida recently addressed the issue of juvenile
restitution, an issue that had come up regularly before the intermediate appel-
late courts over a number of years. 5° The matter came before the Court in
J.A.B. v. State"5 ' on the basis of a conflict between the First and Second Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal.' The issue was whether the trial court may set the
amount of restitution and payment in a reasonable amount upon evidence
showing the earnings that the juvenile may reasonably be expected to make
and may also establish a commencement date for payment so long as the
court provides the juvenile with a reasonable amount of time to obtain em-
ployment.'53 The Supreme Court first ruled that restitution is a creature of
statute and thus was obligated to analyze the language of the Florida law and
legislative intent.'54 The Court concluded that given the language of the sta-
tute and the policies underlining it as well as the wide discretion given judges
in awarding restitution, "a hard and fast rule" prohibiting a judge from estab-
lishing the commencement date for payment of restitution and requiring that
the payments only be ordered contingent upon the juvenile actually getting
employment is inappropriate.'55 However, the Court then added the caveat
that when the State seeks enforcement of an order of restitution based upon
nonpayment, the issue before the court would be whether the "juvenile has
the ability to pay the amount" and that the "juvenile's inability to find em-
ployment despite reasonable efforts" would also be relevant.
5 6
A second restitution case is J.P. v. State.157 In a brief case involving a
theft of projectors from a Miami high school in which the appellant was
148. Id.
149. Id. Waiver of the right to counsel is an important and basic matter with which the
courts should be familiar. See Michael J. Dale, 2005-2006 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 31
NOVA L. REv. 577, 579-82 (2007) [hereinafter Dale, 2005-2006 Survey].
150. See Dale, 2009 Survey, supra note 30, at 216-17.
151. 25 So. 3d 554 (Fla. 2010).
152. See J.A.B. v. State, 993 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (en banc),
approved by 25 So. 3d 554 (Fla. 2010); J.A.M. v. State, 601 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (per curiam), overruled in part by J.A.B., 25 So. 3d at 555.
153. J.A.B., 25 So. 3d at 555.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 560.
156. Id.
157. 35 So. 3d 180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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charged with grand theft, the question was whether the principal's testimony
was adequate to establish the value of the two projectors at the time of the
theft. 5 8 The appellate court noted the principal's testimony of the projectors'
purchase price, the projectors were brand new when installed, and the theft
occurred two months after installation of the projectors. Further, the court
found that it would cost a specific amount to replace each one, which was
adequate to establish the fair market value of the property at the time the
theft occurred.'59
The proper influence of Miranda warnings to juveniles also comes up
regularly in the Florida courts.'6 0 In D.B. v. State,16' a juvenile appealed from
a "denial of a motion to suppress after entering a no contest plea to the
charges of burglary of a dwelling, grand theft and criminal mischief." '162 The
child argued that he was not given Miranda warnings. 63 The court applied
the totality of the circumstances test to conclude that a reasonable eleven-
year-old would not feel free to leave the police interrogation room."6 Since
the court also found that the child was in custody, Miranda warnings were
required.1 65 The appellate court described the location as a small room, un-
der camera surveillance, without the presence of the juvenile's mother.' 66
The court further found that the purpose of the interview was to obtain in-
criminating evidence because the child was placed in the five-by-five inter-
rogation room, left alone with the door closed for sixteen minutes, and when
the police officer entered the room, he advised the child that the child's
mother wanted him to tell the truth.
16 7
Search and seizure issues can also come up in the context of juvenile
delinquency cases in Florida. This was the issue in L.C. v. State. 68 The
child appealed, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation when a police offic-
er performed a weapons search without first performing a pat-down on a
fifteen-year old truant before placing her in the back of a police car to ex-
ecute a statutory obligation to take the child to school.' 69 The police officer
158. Id. at 181.
159. Id. at 181.
160. See Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 26, at 384.
161. 34 So. 3d 224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
162. Id. at 225.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 227.
165. Id.
166. D.B., 34 So. 3d at 227.
167. Id. at 226.
168. 23 So. 3d 1215 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
169. Id. at 1216.
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had no basis to suspect the child of possessing any weapons. 7 ° The police
officer searched all of her pockets and found a small bag of marijuana."'
The case turned on a technicality-the failure of the police officer to conduct
a pat down prior to directly searching the child's pockets.'72 Also significant
to the court's analysis was the fact that the context in which the police officer
took the child into custody was a truancy matter which, under Florida law, is
not a crime. 173 Thus, in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the police offic-
er was not justified in proceeding to a direct search of the child just because
he felt uneasy for his safety. 174 A pat-down was required first. 75 The court
thus reversed and remanded. 176
V. SCHOOL MATTERS
A detailed discussion of school discipline is beyond the purview of this
survey.77 In A.B.E. v. School Board of Brevard County,78 a child appealed
from a final administrative order of the School Board of Brevard County
expelling her. 179 The middle school student was expelled from school after
drinking alcohol and for activities which substantially disrupted the orderly
conduct of the school.' 80 The appellate court held that the school records did
not contain competent substantial evidence to support the Board's finding
that the child was subject to expulsion.' 8' Specifically, the appellate court
said that, under Florida law, the School Board's power to punish the stu-
dent's conduct is limited to conduct that occurs on school premises or during
transportation to and from the school premises. 82 In the case at bar, the
child's actions in drinking alcohol occurred at home in the morning prior to
going to school. 183 Thus, "the School Board could not punish her for con-
170. Id. at 1217.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1219.
173. L.C., 23 So. 3d at 1218 (citing C.G. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)).
174. Id. at 1220.
175. Id..
176. Id.
177. See 1 Michael J. Dale, Representing the Child Client, 6, 10 (Matthew Bender 3d
ed. 2010).
178. 33 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
179. Id. at 796.
180. Id. at 797.
181. Id. at 799.
182. Id. at 798.
183. A.B.E., 33 So. 3d at 798.
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suming the alcohol at home. ' 4 The School Board could, however, punish
her for being under the influence of alcohol while at school. 85 There was no
evidence that the child was under the influence of alcohol because the evi-
dence showed that she had taken only two sips of alcohol at home and then
became sick at school. 186 Apparently, there was also no evidence that the
child's actions at school disrupted the school's learning environment.'87 For
these reasons, the appellate court reversed the expulsion.
188
VI. RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE FATHERS
The Supreme Court of Florida held in 2007, in Heart of Adoptions, Inc.
v. J.A.,189 that unmarried fathers were entitled, as a matter of due process, to
notice of the obligations to file with Florida's Putative Father Registry.' 90 In
a recent case, K.D. v. Gift of Life Adoptions, Inc., 9' an adoption agency pro-
vided some notice to an unmarried father who was in jail in another state. 192
The adoption agency filed the petition for termination of rights pending
adoption prior to the time it served the putative father with notice of the ter-
mination petition. 193 The putative father appealed from the trial court order
granting summary judgment and terminating the father's natural parental
rights. 94 The appellate court reversed, finding that because the father was
not provided with notice until after the petition was filed and was not served
with notice of the intended adoption plan at any time, the procedure violated
the father's right to timely notice and opportunity to comply with obligations
under Florida Putative Father Registry Law. 95
In a second case involving the rights of a putative father, a biological fa-
ther sought rights to his child under circumstances where the child was born
to a couple who was married. In Schuler v. Guardian Ad Litem Program,
196
the putative father and DCF appealed from a trial court order dismissing the
putative father's paternity action and placing the child with DCF for adop-
184. Id. at 799.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. A.B.E., 33 So. 3d at 799.
189. 963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007).
190. Id. at 191.
191. 17 So. 3d 1244 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
192. Id. at 1244.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1246.
195. Id. at 1248; see FLA. STAT. §§ 63.054(1), .062(2) (2010).
196. 17 So. 3d 333 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
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tion. 97 On appeal, the court affirmed on the ground that when a child be-
comes adoptable after the parent's parental rights are terminated, the child
cannot become unadoptable when a third party, albeit the child's biological
father, seeks to intervene.' 98 Under Florida law, a biological father of a child
born during the course of his mother's intact marriage is not the father of the
child.' 99 Rather, it is the mother's husband.2° It is only through a Privette
hearing that the biological father successfully can intervene and obtain rights
as against the biological parents.2°" And when the biological parent seeks to
do so, it must be shown that doing so is in the best interest of the child, and
the burden rests heavily upon the putative parent.202
VII. STATUTORY CHANGES
There were only a few significant statutory changes regarding depen-
dency, TPR, and delinquency matters during the survey year. A provision in
Chapter 39 dealing with confidential material such as medical, mental health,
substance abuse, child welfare, education, and financial records among oth-
ers held by a guardian ad litem were subject to the Open Government Sunset
Review Act. However, that statute was changed by deleting the reference so
as to increase the confidentiality of such records.2 3 Chapter 39 was also
amended to obligate indigent parents to pay their application fee together
with reasonable attorney's fees in dependency and TPR cases as occurs in
other types of proceedings as governed by Chapter 57. 204 A pilot program
for attorneys ad litem, which had been fiscally terminated years earlier, was
effectively repealed June 29, 2002.205
In the delinquency area, a significant change in Chapter 985 dealt with
gender-specific programming, terminating the obligation of the Office of
Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA) to
conduct an analysis of programs for young females within the Department of
Juvenile Justice.20 6 Statutory changes eliminating programs included the
deletion of the pilot program concerned with the cost of supervision and
197. Id. at 335.
198. Id. at 336.
199. Id. at 335.
200. Id.
201. See Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla.
1993).
202. Id. at 308.
203. See FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(4)(a)(2) (2010).
204. See id. § 39.0134(1)
205. FLA. STAT. § 39.4086 (2009).
206. FLA. STAT. § 985.02(8)(a)-(b) (2010).
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care.20 7 The goal of deleting the Task Force Development was to prevent
children from becoming habitual juvenile offenders208 and the removal of the
Department of Juvenile Justice's obligation to present an annual report on the
performance of all assessment and treatment of serious and habitual offend-
ers to various governmental officials.2"
Vi. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida decided just three juvenile law cases this
survey year. The intermediate appellate courts, however, decided a substan-
tial number of cases with a particular focus on termination and depth of anal-
ysis regarding parental rights matters.
207. FLA. STAT. § 985.0395.
208. See id. § 985.047.
209. See id.
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